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calding criticism of Supreme Court arbitration decisions ap-
peared in the 1990’s and is now widespread. Over twenty years 
ago, Jean Sternlight feared Supreme Court arbitration decisions 
“placed consumers' and employees' due process, jury-trial, and Ar-
ticle III rights in serious jeopardy.”1 Professor Sternlight similarly 
warns nowadays that a 2011 arbitration decision by the Court “will 
provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimi-
nation, and other harmful acts without fear of being sued.”2 Simi-
larly, spanning the decades, 1990’s David Schwartz proclaimed 
“The Supreme Court has created a monster” with its “enthusiastic 
approval” of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts 
as generally enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act 
                                                             
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Thanks to Imre 
Szalai, Chris Drahozal, Jean Sternlight, David Schwartz, Luke Norris, and par-
ticipants in the 2017 Loyola Consumer Law Review Symposium for comments. 
Thanks also to Amanda Feriante, Bridget Brazil, Elliott Brewer, and Ellen Ru-
dolph for research assistance. 
1 Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, 
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997). 
2 Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes 
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704-05 (2012). See also Jean R. Sternlight, 
Hurrah for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Consumer Arbitration 
As A Poster Child for Regulation, 48 ST. MARY'S L.J. 343, 357 (2016) (“whereas 
millions of financial consumers who are not subject to pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses receive benefits through class actions, only a minute portion of consum-
ers covered by arbitration clauses actually choose to bring arbitration claims”). 
S 
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(“FAA”).3 Professor Schwartz continues in this decade to accuse Su-
preme Court arbitration decisions of “converting the FAA into a 
radical claim-suppressing statute.”4  
Accomplished scholars like Sternlight and Schwartz are not 
the only sources of strong language opposing the Court’s arbitra-
tion decisions. A state supreme court justice’s concurring opinion a 
generation ago sounded the legal profession’s ultimate alarm—a 
“threat to undermine the rule of law”5—about adhesive arbitration 
agreements that “in effect, subvert our system of justice as we have 
come to know it.” 6 Justice Trieweiler went on to assert that “if any 
foreign government tried to do the same, we would surely consider 
it a serious act of aggression.” 7 This sort of dramatic rhetoric, even 
from normally-circumspect judges, continues over twenty years 
later. Under the heading “Forced Arbitration Destroys Individual 
Rights,” a 2015 federal court decision declares: 
 
Today, forced arbitration bestrides the legal land-
scape like a colossus, effectively stamping out the in-
dividual’s statutory rights wherever inconvenient to 
the businesses which impose them. What is striking is 
that, other than the majority of the Supreme Court, 
whose questionable jurisprudence erected this legal 
monolith, no one thinks they got it right – no one, not 
the inferior federal courts, not the state courts, not the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and 
… not the academic community.8 
                                                             
3 David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Em-
ployee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 33, 33 (1997). 
4 David Schwartz, Symposium, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New 
Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240 (2012). See also David S. Schwartz, Justice Scalia's 
Jiggery-Pokery in Federal Arbitration Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. Headnotes 75, 
78 (2016) (criticizing “a long series of Supreme Court decisions that authorize 
claim-suppressing arbitration”). 
5 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939–40 (Mont. 1994). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 309 F.R.D. 107, 146–47 (D. 
Mass. 2015), as amended (Aug. 7, 2015), aff'd, 842 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016). The 
quoted opinion is by United States District Court Judge William G. Young, who 
5.Ware.docx (Do Not Delete)  5/21/18  2:53 PM 
2018 A Short Defense of Southland, Casarotto, and Other 305 
 
From this alleged consensus of “No one thinks they got it right,” I 
dissent in significant part. While I have long opposed Supreme 
Court decisions on arbitration law’s separability doctrine9 and ju-
dicial review of arbitration awards,10 and would reduce adhesive 
arbitration agreements’ impact on class actions,11 I continue to 
sympathize with some of the Court’s long-controversial arbitration 
decisions.  
I choose the word “sympathize” because I believe much of 
the criticism of the Court’s arbitration decisions does not suffi-
ciently weigh the difficult position the Court was in when deciding 
those cases. The FAA was enacted in the 1920’s before the land-
mark federalism case of Erie v. Tompkins,12 the New Deal’s ex-
pansion of the Commerce Clause and thus of federal power to 
                                                             
was appointed to the bench by President Reagan in 1985. He received an A.B. 
from Harvard University in 1962, and a LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 
1967. Source: Young, William G., U.S. D. DIST. OF MASS., 
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/young.htm (last visited Sep. 16, 2017). 
9 Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 128-38, 159-60 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law's 
Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. 
L.J. 107, 121 (2007); Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Con-
servative) Arbitration Law, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1234-48 (2016). 
10 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law 
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999); Stephen J. Ware, Interstate 
Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, EDWARD BRUNET, 
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88 (2006); Stephen 
J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & 
MEDIATION 56 (2014); Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) 
Arbitration Law, supra note 9, at 1248-60. 
11 Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration 
Law, supra note 9, at 1259-718. 
12 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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preempt state law,13 the growth of federal employment and con-
sumer law in the 1960’s and 1970’s,14 and the ensuing explosion of 
class actions.15 Each of these enormous changes to our nation’s le-
gal landscape conflicted, as explained below, with the premises un-
derlying the FAA. While Congress could have amended the FAA 
to accommodate and be more consistent with these enormous 
                                                             
13 Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of 
the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483-484 (1997) (advocates and opponents agree 
“the constitutional transformation of the New Deal era” was “a nationalist revo-
lution,” as the New Deal Court granted “extensive new powers to Congress,” 
especially “under the Commerce Clause,” so “the states became constitutionally 
dependent on the will of Congress through the latter's power of preemption and 
the operation of the Supremacy Clause.”). 
14 Spencer Weber Waller et al., Consumer Protection in the United States: 
An Overview, 2011 EUR. J. CONSUMER L. 853 (2011) (“[T]he modern consumer 
protection movement began in the 1960s with to the promotion of a Consumer 
Bill of Rights by President Kennedy, the growth of the so-called ‘Great Society’ 
program of the Johnson administration, and the efforts of Ralph Nader and 
other consumer advocates to highlight the existence of unsafe products and the 
need for greater government regulation.”); Terry Carter, Should this toy be 
saved?, ABA JOURNAL (May 1, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://www.abajour-
nal.com/magazine/article/should_this_toy_be_saved/ (“The consumer move-
ment largely developed by Ralph Nader in the mid-1960s reached a pinnacle 
with the creation of the CPSC in 1972.”); William R. Corbett & Frank L. Maraist, 
The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
91, 91–92 (2003) (“In 1960 only two major federal statutory laws regulated em-
ployment. … Then, for a thirty-year period beginning in 1963, Congress enacted 
a host of employment laws.”). 
15 Edward F. Sherman, Decline & Fall, ABA J., June 2007, at 51, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/decline_fall/ (“The rise and fall of 
consumer class actions is a cycle that began in 1966 when the scope of Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was expanded to allow class action suits 
for damages. … [I]n addition to causing consternation in the business sector, the 
increase in class actions ignited an intense debate over whether the social bene-
fits of class actions outweigh their costs.”); Douglas Martin, The Law: The Rise 
and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, NEW YORK TIMES (January 8, 1988), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/08/us/the-law-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-class-
action-lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all  (“[I]n the 1970's, class actions became the 
rage of the legal profession. Now they appear to be dying. The surge of class 
actions, which allow a large group of 'similarly situated’ plaintiffs to combine 
similar claims in a single suit, related to the loosening of rules governing them in 
1966. Fees in class actions were high and there seemed no end to what they might 
accomplish.”). 
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changes, it did not. So, reconciling an old statute with a half cen-
tury of law in tension with that statute’s premises became the 
Court’s task.  
These longstanding issues continue to pervade recent arbi-
tration scholarship, including very recent articles by Margaret Mo-
ses16 and Luke Norris.17 Like many others,18 Professor Moses ar-
gues that the drafters and adopters of the FAA did not intend for 
it to preempt state law or to cover consumer and employment ar-
bitration agreements. She writes: 
 
Neither the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act 
nor the Congress that adopted it intended for it to 
cover consumers or workers, or to displace state ju-
risdiction or state substantive law. The FAA was 
simply intended to provide a means for resolving dis-
putes among commercial entities that might volun-
tarily choose to forego their rights to have their dis-
putes settled in court, in favor of what they deemed 
to be a simpler and more efficient means of dispute 
resolution. That point has been lost on the Supreme 
Court.19 
 
This argument’s two main parts are that the drafters and adopters 
of the FAA did not intend for it to: (1) preempt state law or (2) cover 
consumer and employment arbitration agreements. The following 
pages address these arguments in turn. 
                                                             
16 Margaret L. Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction of the 
FAA Has Affected Consumers, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2017). Moses’ 
recent piece cites and builds upon her earlier article, Margaret L. Moses, Statu-
tory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created A Federal Arbitration 
Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006), so both arti-
cles are cited herein. 
17 Luke P. Norris, The Parity Principle, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249 (2018). 
18 See infra notes 25 and 51.  
19 Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 1. See 
also Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 156 (“Despite concerns 
expressed by members of the 1925 Congress that arbitration not be imposed in a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” context, the Supreme Court since the 1980s has created a 
statute which permits businesses to do exactly that.”) (citing Doctor's Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)). 
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I. ERIE’S IMPACT ON FAA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 
 
The United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause says 
that if a federal law is within the scope of federal power then it is 
supreme over conflicting state law.20 For example, if a defendant 
who would be liable under state tort law shows enforcement of that 
state law would conflict with a federal statute, such as the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act, then the defendant wins 
the case.21 While federal substantive law preempts inconsistent 
state law, and does so whether the case is heard in federal or state 
court,22 federal procedural law does not necessarily preempt state 
law.23 For instance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
preempt inconsistent state law because the Federal Rules of Civil 
                                                             
20 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.”). 
21 See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210–14 (2004) (“re-
spondents’ state causes of action fall within the scope of ERISA * * * and are 
therefore completely pre-empted by ERISA”) (internal quotations omitted); Pilot 
Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1987). 
22 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (“Federal law is enforceable in 
state courts * * * because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as 
much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy 
Clause makes those laws ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and charges state 
courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their reg-
ular modes of procedure.”); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 1378, 1381 (2015) (“The Supremacy Clause instructs courts to give federal 
law priority when state and federal law clash. But it is not the ‘source of any 
federal rights’, and certainly does not create a cause of action.”). 
23 “No one disputes the general and unassailable proposition * * * that States 
may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts.” 
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). However, “Federal law takes state 
courts as it finds them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not im-
pose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.” 
Id. at 150 (internal quotations omitted); Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 767 
(2009) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause supplies [The Supreme Court] with no author-
ity to pre-empt a state procedural law merely because it ‘burdens the exercise’ 
of a federal right in state court.”). 
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Procedure only apply in federal court and the “inconsistent” state 
law, the state rules of civil procedure, only apply in state court. No 
conflict arises because each set of rules governs only in its own fo-
rum. 
The same was true of federal and state arbitration law prior 
to the FAA’s 1925 enactment. Federal arbitration law governed 
only in federal court, while state arbitration law governed only in 
state court.24 The FAA was designed to continue this pattern of fed-
eral arbitration law consisting merely of procedural law governing 
only in federal courts, according to Professor Moses and most other 
scholars.25 In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Southland Corp. 
                                                             
24 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 21–24 (1992); IAN R. 
MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 10.1 (1994 & Supp.1999). 
25 Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 3 
(“[the] proposal to Congress was limited – it was for a statute that would apply 
only to procedure in the federal courts and would not affect state law.”); Id. at 1 
(“Neither the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act nor the Congress that 
adopted it intended it to cover consumers or workers, or to displace state juris-
diction or state substantive law.”) See also David Horton, Federal Arbitration 
Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1219 
(2013) (“Most courts and commentators believe that Congress intended the stat-
ute to be a mere procedural rule for federal courts. Yet three decades ago, in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court held that the FAA applies in state court 
and eclipses contrary state law”); Id. at 1227–28 (“Few modern opinions have 
weathered as much criticism as Southland. ... Ironically, FAA preemption, 
though widely seen as illegitimate, is now well-established.”); IAN R. MACNEIL, 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION 92–121 (1992); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing 
Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L. J. 239, 252 (2012) (“The other error was 
the decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating and its progeny to federalize arbitra-
tion law by holding that the FAA preempts state law. The manifold implications 
of this decision include making a needlessly complex hash of arbitration law by 
interpenetrating federal and state judge-made contract doctrine; creating a ju-
risdictional anomaly by holding the FAA to be the only “substantive” federal law 
that creates no federal question jurisdiction; inhibiting the states’ efforts to pre-
vent misuse of arbitration clauses as loopholes in consumer protection law; and, 
of course, flouting the basic federalism principle, unanimously accepted by the 
Court in other contexts, that Congress cannot constitutionally make procedural 
rules for state courts.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd 
Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 
KAN. L. REV. 795, 834–835 (2012) (“the Southland majority may have been ex-
cessively intent on expanding the Act and embracing arbitration on personal 
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v. Keating,26 that FAA section 2 is substantive federal law govern-
ing in both federal and state courts.27 In defense of Southland, 
Christopher Drahozal notes that its holding is consistent with the 
language of FAA section 2, which “broadly makes ‘valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable’ both pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration 
agreements. Nothing in the language of the section limits its appli-
cation to cases in the federal courts.”28 “By contrast,” he writes, “the 
remaining sections of the FAA by their terms apply only in federal 
court.”29  
Even if the drafters and adopters of the FAA did not intend 
for any of it to apply in state court and preempt state law, this orig-
inal understanding of the FAA would not be conclusive because it 
does not account for the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie v. 
Tompkins.30 This landmark case held that “federal courts lack the 
authority to create ‘federal general common law,’ an authority that 
the Supreme Court had endorsed nearly a century earlier,”31 but 
rather must “apply state law in the same fashion that a state court 
would.”32 Erie is one of the most studied cases ever because of its 
                                                             
preference grounds rather than giving the issue the careful reading of precedent 
that it deserved.”); Imre S. Szalai, Directv, Inc. v. Imburgia: How the Supreme 
Court Used A Jedi Mind Trick to Turn Arbitration Law Upside Down, 32 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 75, 88 (2017) (describing Southland as “infamous” and 
“one of the biggest errors in the Court's history”). 
26 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
27 Id. at 12 (“the Arbitration Act ‘creates a body of federal substantive law’ 
and…the substantive law the Act created [is] applicable in state and federal 
courts.”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 25 (1983)). 
28 Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Leg-
islative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 
123 (2002). 
29 Id. 
30 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
31 Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine - (and what does it mean 
for the contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
245, 247–48 (2008). 
32 Under Erie, “a federal court has an obligation to apply state law in the 
same fashion that a state court would. … Erie represents a broad principle of 
federal-state relations within our system of federalism.” John D. Echeverria, Is 
Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579, 616–17 
(2010). “While Erie put state and federal courts on equal footing when it came to 
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pervasive importance,33 and Erie posed a strong challenge to inter-
preting the FAA to apply only in federal courts. As I wrote over 
twenty years ago:  
 
“When it was enacted in 1925, the FAA was a proce-
dural statute applicable only in federal courts.” Dur-
ing the following decades, there was “universal recog-
nition that the FAA had nothing to do with 
proceedings in state courts.” This changed when the 
Supreme Court considered the effects of its landmark 
decisions in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York34. Erie held that federal courts lack 
power to create substantive law, so they must decide 
cases according to state substantive law and federal 
procedural law. Erie thus required a line between 
“substance” and “procedure.” Guaranty Trust pro-
vided such a line; it put on the substantive side any 
law that was “outcome determinative.” The Supreme 
Court used that line in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. 
of America35 to conclude that the FAA is substantive 
law. Thus Erie, Guaranty Trust and Bernhardt 
moved the “FAA from the procedural side of the law, 
where Congress had put it in 1925, to the substantive 
                                                             
the substantive elements of the litigants' claims and defenses, the conventional 
wisdom is that it did not eliminate disparities with respect to many aspects of 
civil procedure.” Steinman, supra note 31, at 248. 
33 “Erie’s significance and challenging inscrutability have combined to make 
it the Mount Everest of Supreme Court jurisprudence.” Allan Erbsen, Erie's 
Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 579, 588 (2013). See also Steinman, supra note 31, at 247-48 (“During its 
first seven decades, Erie has achieved a mythic status, and it has been a constant 
subject of scholarly debate and analysis. So profound is Erie's mystique that Pro-
fessor Larry Lessig coined the term ‘Erie-effect’ to describe legal developments 
that radically transform prevailing views of institutional authority. Erie's man-
date was that federal courts lack the authority to create ‘federal general common 
law,’ an authority that the Supreme Court had endorsed nearly a century earlier 
in Swift v. Tyson.”). 
34 Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).  
35 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
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side, where Congress had most decidedly not put it.”36 
 
Once the FAA became understood as substan-
tive law, a troubling issue arose about the FAA's con-
stitutionality. If the FAA applied only in the federal 
courts then the Supreme Court “would have had to 
decide if Congress could legislate where Erie had for-
bidden the federal courts to create common law.”37 In 
1967 the Court in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co.38 avoided this difficult issue by concluding, 
against the evidence, that Congress had enacted the 
FAA pursuant to its power to regulate interstate com-
merce. “The Court did not quite say that the FAA 
governs in state court, but its reasoning left little room 
for any other result.” The Supreme Court eventually 
concluded that the FAA governs in state court in the 
1980s cases of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp., and Southland Corp. v. 
Keating.39 
 
To recap, Erie’s fundamental change of the relationship between 
federal and state law—a change that far transcends the FAA or any 
other statute—may well have made the FAA unconstitutional had 
the Supreme Court interpreted the FAA as many argue its drafters 
and adopters originally understood it. In contrast, the Court’s dif-
ferent, but still plausible, interpretation of the FAA preserved its 
constitutionality.  
When a statute admits of more than one plausible interpre-
tation, courts routinely choose the interpretation that preserves the 
statute’s constitutionality. The Supreme Court has long followed 
                                                             
36 Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1007–08 (1996) (quoting 
IAN MACNEIL, RICHARD SPEIDEL & THOMAS STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW (1994)). 
37 Id. (quoting Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The 
Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1985)). 
38 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
39 Ware, supra note 36 (quoting MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra 
note 36, § 10.4.2).  
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this “avoidance canon,”40 so it is quite ordinary that the Court, after 
                                                             
40 Hooper v. Cal., 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that every 
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from un-
constitutionality.”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (quoting Crom-
well v. Benson 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) ("When the validity of an act of the Con-
gress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is 
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”); 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“where an otherwise acceptable construction of a stat-
ute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the stat-
ute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the 
intent of Congress.”); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 859 (1989) (“It is the 
Court's settled policy, however, to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute 
that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation 
poses no constitutional question.”); Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395 
(2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“The modern canon of avoidance is a doctrine 
under which courts construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional doubts, 
but this doctrine has its origins in a very different form of the canon. Tradition-
ally, the avoidance canon was not a doctrine under which courts read statutes to 
avoid mere constitutional doubts. Instead, it commanded courts, when faced 
with two plausible constructions of a statute--one constitutional and the other 
unconstitutional--to choose the constitutional reading.”); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 562 (2012) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 
142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J. concurring)) (“Justice Holmes made the same point a 
century later: ‘[T]he rule is that as between two possible interpretations of a stat-
ute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our 
plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.’”); William K. Kelley, Avoid-
ing Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
831 (2001) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999)) (“The rule 
of ‘constitutional doubt’ holds that ‘where a statute is susceptible of two con-
structions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and 
by the other of which such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to adopt the 
latter.’ That familiar canon of statutory construction…has been ‘repeatedly af-
firmed’ to the point that it has achieved rare status as a ‘cardinal principle’ that 
‘is beyond debate.’”); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Ex-
ecutive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2006) (quoting Edward J. De-
Bartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575 (1988)) (“Known colloquially as the avoidance canon, it is most commonly 
described as providing that ‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a 
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
statute to avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to 
the intent of Congress.’”); Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpreta-
tion and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275 (2016) (“In its original formula-
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Erie, preserved the FAA’s constitutionality by interpreting its 
main substantive provision, section 2, to apply in state courts. That 
this interpretation of the FAA is at least plausible is supported by 
Professor Drahozal who points out that “The language of [FAA] 
section 2 broadly makes ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’ both 
pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements. Nothing in 
the language of the section limits its application to cases in the fed-
eral courts.”41 By contrast, Drahozal writes, “the remaining sections 
of the FAA by their terms apply only in federal court.”42 
While Professor Moses similarly traces the FAA’s history 
through Erie, Guaranty Trust, Bernhardt, and Prima Paint,43 she 
accuses the Court of “disregarding text and legislative history.”44 
However, as just noted, the text of the FAA is consistent with the 
Court’s conclusion that section 2 of the FAA, but not its other sec-
tions, applies in state courts. And while the Court’s interpretation 
of the FAA may have disregarded the FAA’s legislative history, 
such disregard is consistent with mainstream approaches to statu-
tory interpretation that, for good reasons, tend to give little or no 
weight to legislative history.45 So a Supreme Court that disregards 
                                                             
tion—so-called classic avoidance—the canon provides that ‘as between two pos-
sible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional 
and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.’ 
This means that the reviewing court must first decide that one possible interpre-
tation would make the statute unconstitutional, and only then can it choose a 
different interpretation to avoid this problem.”). 
41 Drahozal, supra note 28. 
42 Id. 
43 Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 114-18. 
44 Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 8.  
45 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 
1750, 1763 (2010) (“Constitutionally, textualists argue that statutory ‘purpose’ as 
evinced by legislative history [committee reports, floor statements, etc.] is not 
permitted to trump enacted text because only enacted text is ‘law’ - that is, only 
enacted text goes through the constitutionally prescribed process of bicameral-
ism and presentment.  Some textualists also argue that reliance on legislative 
history works an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking authority to subpor-
tions of Congress [committees], or worse, congressional staffers [who write the 
reports].  As a result, strict textualists will not consider legislative history to re-
solve statutory ambiguity.”); John F. Manning, Annual Review of Administra-
tive Law, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1538 
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legislative history in favor of a textually plausible statutory inter-
pretation that preserves the statute’s constitutionality deserves our 
sympathy. The post-Erie Court faced a difficult predicament and 
worked through it pretty well—certainly better than the alterna-
tive of holding that Erie had rendered the FAA unconstitutional.  
Along these lines, Margaret Moses is not wholly critical of 
the Court, which she says, “reached a pragmatic result.”46 In this 
regard, the Court’s Prima Paint decision was key because its hold-
ing that Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its Commerce 
power presaged Southland’s holding that the FAA preempts state 
law.47 Professor Moses writes that Prima Paint “may appear to be 
a good example of dynamic statutory interpretation,” which is the 
view that “a judge may legitimately interpret a statute in a way 
that goes beyond-or even against-the original purpose or intent if 
justified by changes in current circumstances or mores.”48 Moses 
rightly says “the Prima Paint Court appears to have adapted the 
FAA to a change in circumstances-the sea change brought about 
                                                             
(2014) (“The Court now works hard to ascertain whether the text is clear, ex-
hausting semantic resources before turning to legislative history. Perhaps most 
importantly, if the Court finds the statutory text to be clear, that is the end of the 
matter; legislative intent, as revealed by the legislative history, can no longer 
trump the unambiguous import of the statutory text. As the Court has written, 
‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means 
in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, 
then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'’”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (“statutory text and structure, as opposed to leg-
islative history and intent (actual or imputed), supply the proper foundation for 
meaning.”) See also Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 302 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Con-
stitution gives legal effect to the “Laws” Congress enacts, Art. VI, cl. 2, not the 
objectives its Members aimed to achieve in voting for them. (Citation omitted). 
If § 3730(e)(4)(A)'s text includes state and local administrative reports and audits, 
as the Court correctly concludes it does, then it is utterly irrelevant whether the 
Members of Congress intended otherwise. Anyway, it is utterly impossible to 
discern what the Members of Congress intended except to the extent that intent 
is manifested in the only remnant of “history” that bears the unanimous endorse-
ment of the majority in each House: the text of the enrolled bill that became 
law.”). 
46 Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 121. 
47 See supra notes 37-39. 
48 Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 121. 
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by Erie and Guaranty Trust-and interpreted the statute in a way 
that preserved the intent of the enacting Congress to apply the stat-
ute in federal court in diversity cases.”49 
 
II. FAA SECTION 2’S APPLICATION TO CONSUMERS 
 
A. Statutory Text Trumps Legislative History 
 
The previous section reviews the Supreme Court’s Erie-re-
lated, constitutionality-preserving interpretation of FAA section 2 
as substantive federal law preempting inconsistent state law. Sec-
tion 2 states: 
 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the re-
fusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an ex-
isting controversy arising out of such a contract, 
                                                             
49 Id. After Guaranty Trust and Bernhardt, the Supreme Court applied Erie 
in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), and Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 
U.S. 22, 27 (1988). Professor Moses writes that only the latter of these cases, de-
cided long after Prima Paint and even after Southland, might have led to a dif-
ferent result in Prima Paint had it by then replaced Guaranty Trust; Margaret 
L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created A Fed-
eral Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 
117–18 (2006) (“Language in Erie suggested that the Article III power to control 
federal courts did not give Congress the right to create rules which affected sub-
stantive areas of state law. It was only in Ricoh that those concerns were resolved 
in favor of congressional power. Thus, as the courts in Bernhardt and its progeny 
viewed Erie, for the FAA to apply in a diversity case, the statute must have been 
based on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.”) See also Leslie M. 
Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seri-
ously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 81–82 (1998) (quoting 19 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d § 
4505 (2d ed. 1996)) (“Together, the Bernhardt and Prima Paint cases imply that 
there may be some matters that, although they are ‘rationally capable of classi-
fication as procedural’ within the meaning of Hanna, nevertheless are so sub-
stantive that Congress cannot displace state law in the area other than through 
an exercise of Article I powers.”). 
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transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.50 
 
Despite the breadth of FAA section 2’s language, “transaction in-
volving commerce,” Professor Moses (like several others51) argues: 
“Neither the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act nor the Con-
gress that adopted it intended it to cover consumers or workers. … 
The FAA was simply intended to provide a means for resolving 
disputes among commercial entities.”52 However, the text of FAA 
section 2 did not make enforceable only arbitration agreements be-
tween “commercial entities” or “merchants” or “businesses.” It 
                                                             
50 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
51 Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act As Procedural Reform, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1973 (2014) (FAA intended “to simplify business disputing 
procedure and to improve the administration of justice.”); Christopher R. Leslie, 
The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 308 (2015) (Congress “intended 
the FAA to allow enforcement only of arbitration agreements between mer-
chants. Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to consumer contracts.”); Jean 
R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 729–30 
(2001) (“the Federal Arbitration Act was never intended to permit companies to 
impose arbitration on unknowing consumers and employees, but rather was 
merely intended to allow two sophisticated businesses to enter into predispute 
arbitration agreements.”); Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act Through the Lens of History, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 118 (2016) (the 
FAA “was enacted to cover privately-negotiated arbitration agreements between 
merchants…the Supreme Court has expanded the statute to…compel arbitra-
tion of…consumer disputes…”) See also Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunc-
tions and No-Modification Terms: Challenging “Anti-Reform” Provisions in Ar-
bitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, at 469 (2015) (the “Supreme Court 
has been on a bit of a pro-arbitration tear recently, upholding ever-more draco-
nian dispute resolution clauses inserted in standard-form contracts against all 
sorts of legal and policy-based challenges”); David Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 
105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 1001-02 (2017) (“Although the Court’s doctrine has re-
peatedly stressed the benefits of arbitration, that doctrine makes no serious effort 
to identify or police arbitration’s costs. … If there are problems with arbitration, 
they are not apparent from reading the Court’s majority opinions.”). 
52 Moses, How the Supreme Court’s Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 1; 
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 111–12 (“The FAA was a 
bill of limited scope, intended to apply in disputes between merchants of approx-
imately equal economic strength”).  
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made enforceable all arbitration agreements in all sorts of contracts 
“involving commerce” between all sorts of parties, except for “con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”53  
While the FAA’s legislative history reflects concerns about 
non-employment adhesion contracts, such as insurance policies,54 
these concerns did not find their way into the statute’s text. So, un-
der mainstream approaches to statutory interpretation that, for 
good reasons, prioritize statutory text far above legislative his-
tory,55 it is enough to say Congress knew how to except types of 
parties from FAA section 2 and chose to except some employees 
but not any consumers. Consequently, if consumers make arbitra-
tion agreements “involving commerce,” then those agreements are 
covered by the FAA.56 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court applied FAA section 2 to 
enforce a consumer’s adhesive arbitration agreement in the 1995 
                                                             
53 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“‘commerce’, as herein defined, means commerce 
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the 
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and 
another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or be-
tween the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but 
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.”). 
54 See A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce; and A Bill to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or 
Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime 
Transactions or Commerce Among the States or Territories or With Foreign Na-
tions: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
67th Cong. 9-11 (1923) (statement of Senator Walsh) (“The trouble about the 
matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not 
voluntarily [sic] things at all. Take an insurance policy. … You can take that or 
you can leave it. … It is the same with a good many contracts of employment.”). 
See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (Sen. Walsh “was emphatically assured 
by the supporters of the bill that it was not their intention to cover such cases.”). 
55 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
56 See discussion infra Section II.D., discussing the argument that applying 
FAA section 2 to consumer contracts is inconsistent with the intent of the Con-
gress that enacted it. 
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case of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.57 The following 
year, in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto,58 the Court held that par-
ties relying on state law to oppose enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments were limited to arguments based in general contract law, as 
opposed to state laws designed to protect parties from arbitration 
clauses in particular. Casarotto involved a Montana statute requir-
ing that notice of an arbitration clause be given on the first page of 
a contract.59 The Court held that this Montana statute directly con-
flicted with FAA section 2’s command that arbitration agreements 
be enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract” because the Montana statute 
“condition[ed] the enforceability of arbitration agreements on com-
pliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to con-
tracts generally.”60  
This seems to me the best interpretation of FAA section 2’s 
language, as a matter of pure statutory interpretation.61 However, 
I confess to liking its consequences more than most progressives do. 
This difference about the desirability of Casarotto’s consequences 
may reflect different beliefs about the facts—what consequences 
                                                             
57 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74, 77 (1995) 
(stating that “[a]fter examining the statute's language, background, and struc-
ture, we conclude that the word ‘involving’ is broad and is indeed the functional 
equivalent of ‘affecting’” and thus “signals an intent to exercise Congress' com-
merce power to the full.”).  
58 Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996). 
59 Mont. Code Ann. § 27–5–114(4) (1995) (“Notice that a contract is subject 
to arbitration…shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of 
the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not 
be subject to arbitration.”) This language was deleted from the statute in 1997. 
60 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. 
61 Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1008–1014 (1996) (“The 
Supreme Court correctly held that the Montana statute is preempted by the FAA 
because the Montana statute ‘conditions the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to con-
tracts generally.’ In other words, the Montana statute is preempted because it 
creates a ground for the revocation of an arbitration agreement-failure to include 
a capitalized, underlined, page-one notice-that does not ‘exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.’ The FAA ‘precludes States from singling out 
arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions 
be placed upon the same footing as other contracts.’”). 
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flow from routine enforcement of adhesive arbitration agree-
ments—as I do not share the belief of many progressives that the 
most relevant empirical evidence shows such enforcement tends to 
harm consumers.62 That topic is discussed next.  
 
B. Consequences of Routine Enforcement of Adhesive  
Arbitration Agreements 
 
Professor Moses writes: “There are a number of good stud-
ies, books, and articles about the adverse impact of forced arbitra-
tion on consumers. They point out that mandatory arbitration 
leads to fewer claims brought by consumers, as well as lower re-
coveries and less deterrence of corporate wrongdoing.”63 In con-
trast, my writings argue not only that “forced” and “mandatory” 
are inaccurate rhetoric for adhesive arbitration agreements,64 but 
also that the most relevant empirical data does show that such 
agreements tend to have the consequences alleged by Professor 
Moses.65 For instance, she cites data collected by Theodore Eisen-
berg and Geoffrey Miller to suggest that “firms that impose arbi-
                                                             
62 Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration 
Agreements, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 65-119 (2017). 
63 Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 16–
17 (citing Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and 
Class Action Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Con-
gress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & POLICY REVIEW 329 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg, 
Geoffrey Miller, Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical 
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. 
MICH. J. L REFORM 871, 883-85 (2008); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chan-
drasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration” 
104 GEORGETOWN L. J. 57 (2015); Margaret Radin, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHT AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting 
Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 Sw. L. Rev, 87 (2012); David S. Schwartz, 
Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L. J. 239 (2012); David 
S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The 
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
5, 17 (2004). 
64 Ware, supra note 62, at 43-51. 
65 Id. at 65-119. 
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tration on their customers and employees tend not to put arbitra-
tion contracts in their negotiated contracts,”66 from which she con-
cludes “companies prefer litigation when dealing with peers.”67 
However, Professor Moses does not cite a (in my view, persuasive,) 
reply to Eisenberg and Miller contending that Eisenberg and Mil-
ler’s data “likely significantly understates the use of arbitration 
clauses in contracts between sophisticated parties” because “Eisen-
berg and Miller focus on types of contracts that are unlikely to in-
clude arbitration clauses [and] either do not consider, or pay little 
heed to, the types of contracts that the arbitration literature com-
monly identifies as likely to include arbitration clauses.”68  
Similarly, Professor Moses describes a series of New York 
Times articles as “informing the public of the harms of forced arbi-
tration.” In contrast, I do not think those articles even-handedly 
portray arbitration, with charges that arbitrators “commonly con-
sider the companies their clients” and “have twisted or outright dis-
regarded the law” to rule favorably towards the companies,69 and 
“the rules of arbitration largely favor companies, which can even 
steer cases to friendly arbitrators.”70 
Following others, Professor Moses cites other nations’ re-
fusal to enforce adhesive arbitration agreements as support for her 
                                                             
66 Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 18 
(citing Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Sum-
mer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-
consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L REFORM 871, 883-85 (2008). 
67 Id. 
68 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or 
Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 463-64 
(2010). 
69 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatiza-
tion of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-
justice-system.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, A Privatiza-
tion of the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1; Jessica Silver-Green-
berg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking Deck of Justice, N. 
Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 
When Scripture is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2015, at A1. 
70 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-
deck-of-justice.html?_r=1. 
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arguments that the U.S. should do likewise. She writes that U.S. 
enforcement of consumers’ adhesive arbitration agreements “has 
reduced their access to court systems, which means no right to a 
jury trial, no right to a class action,” and other consequences.71 
However, the civil jury and class action have long been nearly 
unique to the U.S. and barely exist elsewhere,72 so I have written: 
 
Much of what makes civil litigation in the United 
States materially different from civil litigation else-
where in the world can plausibly be traced back to the 
jury. By contrast, enforcement of consumer and em-
ployment arbitration agreements affects only a few 
categories of cases and, within those categories, af-
                                                             
71 Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 19; 
For an earlier similar argument see, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a 
Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employ-
ment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 839 
(2002). 
72 Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in Com-
parative Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
865, 867 (2002) (“The United States is the only major nation to make extensive 
use of jury trials in civil cases.”) (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: 
Challenge and Reform 193-94 n.1 (1996) (referring to the abolition of the civil 
jury as ‘a course that the rest of the civilized world took long ago‘); Konrad 
Zweigert & Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 267 (1977); Chris-
topher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the EU and 
the US, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 357 (2002)). See also Justice Scott Bris-
ter, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 
191, 193 (2005) (“Duke Law School professor Neil Vidmar reports that fifty-four 
countries currently provide for trial by jury, fifty-three of them in criminal cases 
only. The United States is the only country in the world that routinely employs 
juries in civil trials.”)(citing Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Per-
spective On the Common Law Jury, in World Jury Systems 1, 3 (Neil Vidmar 
ed., 2000)); Richard J. Peltz-Steele, Wrongs, Rights, and Remedies: A Yankee 
Romp in Recent European Tort Law, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 102, 160-
61 (2016) (“Europe has been slow to develop collective action, and conventional 
wisdom states that perceived excesses against enterprise in the U.S. have been 
cautionary.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Re-
thinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 401 (2014) (“[U]ntil 
fairly recently, the class action device was a uniquely American innovation, re-
sisted (if not rejected) by most foreign legal systems.”). 
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fects only those cases in which an enforceable arbitra-
tion agreement has been formed. The civil jury is a 
mountain; enforcement of consumer and employment 
arbitration agreements is a molehill. Those who value 
uniformity across nations and seek to bring U.S. law 
into the international mainstream should be far more 
troubled by the civil jury than by enforcement of con-
sumer and employment arbitration agreements. 
 
Bringing the United States into the main-
stream on the civil jury might even bring it into the 
mainstream on arbitration. It may not be a coinci-
dence that the only nation with the civil jury is the 
only nation that enforces consumer and employment 
arbitration agreements. Eliminating the civil jury 
might eliminate the three aforementioned peculiari-
ties of U.S. litigation: costly and intrusive discovery, 
theatrical trials, and complex evidence law. While 
each of these peculiarities may please U.S. lawyers, 
avoiding these peculiarities may be a common reason 
why businesses flee U.S. courts for arbitration. After 
all, arbitration is generally thought to eliminate costly 
and intrusive discovery, theatrical trials, and complex 
evidence law. Perhaps eliminating these peculiarities 
from U.S. litigation would substantially reduce the 
desire of businesses to flee U.S. courts for arbitra-
tion.73 
 
Much the same might be said of the class action since businesses’ 
desire to avoid consumer class actions is widely thought to be one 
of the largest factors motivating businesses to put arbitration 
clauses in their consumer form contracts.74  
Whatever one thinks of the consequences flowing from 
widespread enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements, all 
can agree that Casarotto contributed greatly to that enforcement 
                                                             
73 Ware, supra note 72, at 870–71. 
74 Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing, supra note 62, at 74-82 
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and those consequences. While Professor Moses writes that Casa-
rotto means “states are not permitted to protect their citizens from 
perceived abuses arising from a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ arbitration re-
quirement,”75 Casarotto permits states to do exactly that if they do 
so by using unconscionability and other contract-law doctrines in 
ways that do not discriminate against arbitration clauses compared 
to other contract clauses.76 However, contract law generally en-
forces most terms of adhesion contracts, so it is unsurprising that 
contract-law-based challenges to adhesive arbitration agreements 
often lose and, since Casarotto, courts have routinely enforced 
countless arbitration clauses in a wide variety of consumers’ adhe-





                                                             
75 Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 156 (citing Doctor's 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)). 
76 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 682 (“Generally applicable contract defenses, such 
as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration 
agreements without contravening § 2, but courts may not invalidate arbitration 
agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”) (citing 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)). See also 
STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW § 
25 (2017) (citing cases holding arbitration agreements unconscionable and dis-
cussing FAA’s constraint on breadth of unconscionability doctrine as applied to 
arbitration agreements). 
77 Amanda R. James, Because Arbitration Can be Beneficial, It Should 
Never Have to be Mandatory: Making a Case Against Compelled Arbitration 
Based Upon Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Consumer and Employee 
Adhesion Contracts, 62 LOY. L. REV. 531, 541 (2016) (“[A]dhesion contracts with 
an arbitration clause may pose unique problems for the weaker party, because 
they are routinely upheld by courts.”); Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection and the Circumvention 
of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1991, 1219 (2001) (“Courts often re-
solve the issue of enforceability of arbitration clauses in adhesion contract in fa-
vor of the corporation.”) See also Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: 
What the Numbers Tell Us About How State Courts Apply the Unconscionabil-
ity Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 802 (2014) (iden-
tifying “quite a bit of variety in how state courts view the unconscionability doc-
trine in general, as well as how they apply the doctrine to both arbitration and 
non-arbitration provisions”). 
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C. Concepcion and Class Actions 
 
The significance of routine enforcement of adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements further increased in 2011 when the Court’s deci-
sion in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion78 significantly weakened one 
of consumers’ most powerful threats to business defendants, the 
class action. Concepcion enforced an adhesive arbitration agree-
ment’s provision requiring individual, rather than class, adjudica-
tion.79 Such “class waivers” are unconscionable under California 
law if “’found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve 
small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party 
with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to de-
liberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.’”80 The Supreme Court held that even though 
this California rule apparently applied both to waivers concerning 
class litigation as well as waivers concerning class arbitration,81 the 
California rule “interfer[ed] with fundamental attributes of arbitra-
tion thus creat[ing] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”82 
While Margaret Moses is very critical of Concepcion, I am 
                                                             
78 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333 (2011). 
79 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336 (“The contract provided for arbitration of all 
disputes between the parties but required that claims be brought in the parties' 
‘individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported 
class or representative proceeding.’”). 
80 Id. at 339–340 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 
1110 (Cal. 2005)).  
81 Id. at 341 (“The Concepcions argue that the Discover Bank rule, given its 
origins in California's unconscionability doctrine and California's policy against 
exculpation, is a ground that ‘exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract’ under FAA § 2. Moreover, they argue that even if we construe the Dis-
cover Bank rule as a prohibition on collective-action waivers rather than simply 
an application of unconscionability, the rule would still be applicable to all dis-
pute-resolution contracts, since California prohibits waivers of class litigation as 
well.”); Id. at 341–42 (“But the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine 
normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, 
unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors ar-
bitration…because such a rule applies the general principle of unconscionability 
or public-policy disapproval of exculpatory agreements, it is applicable to “any” 
contract and thus preserved by § 2 of the FAA.”). 
82 Id. at 341, 344. 
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less critical of it. Professor Moses characterizes Concepcion as an 
unprincipled exception to Casarotto, which she says: 
 
Gives the Supreme Court a basis for intruding on a 
core state law function (such as contract law) any time 
a provision appears to limit the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement, if contracts generally are not 
limited in the same way. However, when it suits, the 
Court has ignored this rule, in favor of striking a lim-
itation on arbitration even though the same limitation 
is also applied to litigated matters, as we see in a class 
action waiver case decided by the Court in 2011– 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception.83  
 
In contrast, I believe “Concepcion correctly interprets FAA § 2's 
use of the word ‘arbitration’ to make § 2 more than just a prohibi-
tion against discriminating against arbitration agreements.”84 
 
“Arbitration” is widely understood to mean a form of 
binding adjudication that is not litigation. However, 
if a state could hold unconscionable any agreement 
for binding adjudication that does not use the same 
procedural and evidentiary rules as litigation and the 
same trier of fact (jury) as litigation, then the so-called 
“arbitration” left enforceable in that state would be 
too close to litigation to qualify as “arbitration” as that 
term is used in FAA § 2. The only significant differ-
ence between this so-called “arbitration” and litiga-
tion would be that the parties would select and pay 
for the “judge” conducting the jury trial under the 
same rules of procedure and evidence that a govern-
mentally selected and paid judge in litigation would 
use. So § 2 must be interpreted to prevent states from 
holding unconscionable agreements to use a form of 
binding adjudication that differs from litigation more 
                                                             
83 Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 12. 
84 Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration 
Law, supra note 9, at 1277–78. 
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profoundly than merely selecting and paying for the 
judge. 
 
How much more profoundly? A form of bind-
ing adjudication that significantly differs from litiga-
tion by having (1) less discovery, (2) fewer evidentiary 
rules, and (3) no jury should be different enough to 
qualify as “arbitration,” and thus immune from char-
acterization as per se unconscionable or otherwise un-
enforceable. Concepcion's interpretation of FAA § 2 
adds a fourth difference required to be different 
enough to qualify as “arbitration”: (4) no class actions. 
...[T]his conclusion of Concepcion is plausible as an 
interpretation of the FAA, but, as a matter of policy, 
I think the enforceability of arbitral class waivers 
ought to conform to non-arbitration law on class 
waivers.85 
 
In other words, while my policy preference would treat arbitral 
class waivers like non-arbitral class waivers, I believe Concep-
cion’s legal analysis is at least plausible. 
In sum, Casarotto and Concepcion have their critics and de-
fenders, but all can agree these two cases importantly affect many 
consumer disputes and these effects would not occur but for FAA 
section 2’s language reaching consumer transactions “involving 
commerce.”  
 
D. The Post-FAA Expansion of the Commerce Clause 
 
When the FAA was enacted, “very few” consumer transac-
tions “would have involved interstate commerce and thus fallen 
under the jurisdiction of the FAA.”86 The vast increase in consumer 
transactions now held to involve commerce under the FAA reflects 
not only an increase in long-distance consumer transactions, but 
also the Supreme Court's expansion of the U.S. Constitution’s 
                                                             
85 Id. 
86 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme 
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. REV. 637, 647 (1996). 
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Commerce Clause87 to cover transactions previously considered in-
tra-state and thus beyond the reach of federal legislation.88 So, if 
applying FAA section 2 to consumer contracts is inconsistent with 
the intent of the Congress that enacted it, that inconsistency is more 
properly blamed on the Court's post-FAA broadening of the Com-
merce Clause than on the Court's interpretation of the FAA.89  
The key moment in the Court’s post-FAA broadening of the 
Commerce Clause was 1937 when, during the Great Depression, 
the Court abandoned original understanding of the Constitution to 
permit what would otherwise have been unconstitutional—the 
New Deal. In 1935 and 1936, the Court struck down several key 
pieces of New Deal legislation.90 President Franklin Delano Roose-
velt thought “a recalcitrant Court was preventing the country from 
achieving necessary recovery and reform,”91 and he “chastise[d] the 
Justices for their ‘horse and buggy interpretation’ of the Commerce 
Clause.”92 After his landslide 1936 reelection, Roosevelt announced 
in February 1937 his plan to enlarge the Court's membership from 
nine to fifteen, which would have allowed him to appoint enough 
justices to reverse the Court’s recent decisions, and thus uphold the 
New Deal.93 “[T]he 1936 elections had given the Democrats domi-
nant supermajorities in both the House and the Senate,” which 
gave Roosevelt “good reason to hope” that his “court-packing” bill 
                                                             
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”). 
88 See Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Com-
merce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 385, 459 (1992). 
89 Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other 
Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. L. 
REV. 167, 180 n.76 (2004) (“If applying the FAA to consumer contracts is incon-
sistent with the intent of the Congress that enacted it, that inconsistency is more 
properly blamed on the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause than on 
the Court's interpretation of the FAA.”). 
90 Barry Cushman, The Court-Packing Plan as Symptom, Casualty, and 
Cause of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2089, 2090 (2013). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 2093. 
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would be approved.94 “In April, however, before the bill came to a 
vote in Congress, two Supreme Court justices came over to the lib-
eral side and by a narrow majority upheld as constitutional the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act.”95 
This “switch in time that saved nine” “provided the basis for 
a profound shift from federalism to nationalism [that has] effec-
tively given Congress a police power…to regulate any matter un-
der the guise of the original Commerce Clause.”96 As Professors 
Eskridge and Ferejohn explain:  
 
The Court's switch in time averted a constitutional 
showdown between the Court and the political sys-
tem, and between 1937 and 1943 Roosevelt remade 
the Court with nine nominees. The immediate agenda 
of the New Deal Court was to interpret the Com-
merce Clause broadly enough to embrace regulatory 
legislation with incidental (but demonstrable) effects 
on interstate commerce, and with this the coalition 
consolidated the new Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence with unanimous majorities by 1942.97 
                                                             
94 Id. at 2094. 
95 Roosevelt announces “court-packing” plan, HISTORY (2010), 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-pack-
ing-plan. See also N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
(upholding National Labor Relations Act due to a swing vote by Justice Owen 
Roberts); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act 
due to a swing vote by Justice Owen Roberts); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 70 (2010) (“The 
prevailing popular…account of the ‘switch in time that saved nine’ begins with 
a Court of four stalwart conservatives who battled with three liberal ‘musket-
eers’ for the survival of the New Deal. Holding the balance were the swing votes 
of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts, who in the 1934-1935 terms sided 
with the four conservatives to successively demolish New Deal infrastructure. 
When Roosevelt unveiled the court-packing plan, the story has it, the Court--or 
more specifically Justice Roberts—caved. … Thus, in a somersault of constitu-
tional history, the switch in time resurrected the New Deal and spared the Court 
from packing.”) Id. at 72 (“Roberts shifted sharply (and statistically significantly) 
to the left in the 1936 term” which includes the 1937 cases listed above). 
96 Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A 
Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 163 (1998). 
97 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: 
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In sum, “The New Deal inverted the basic orientation of Com-
merce Clause doctrine. As of 1932, it was still possible to say that 
the Commerce Clause was one of several limited and enumerated 
federal regulatory powers. A decade later it seemed fairer to say 
that the Commerce Clause gave the federal government unlimited 
and general powers.”98 
The previous paragraph explained that much of the New 
Deal—perhaps the nation’s most important progressive economic 
legislation—would have been unconstitutional had the 1937-Era 
Court adhered to the narrower understanding of (interstate) com-
merce prevalent during the FAA’s 1925 enactment. The same can 
likely be said of—perhaps the nation’s most important progressive 
social legislation—the Civil Rights Act of 1964,99 including Title 
                                                             
A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAN. L. REV. 1355 (2007). 
98 Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive 
Political Theory and the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. 
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 403, 425 (2002). See also Steven A. Delchin, Viewing the 
Constitutionality of the Access Act Through the Lens of Federalism, 47 CASE W. 
RES. 553, 567 (1997) (“During the early years of the Great Depression the Court 
was still clinging to a restrictive view of commerce power. Yet the dam holding 
back federal power…broke under the weight of a true constitutional revolution 
brought on by the New Deal. … The later New Deal cases confirmed the near 
evisceration of any substantive limits on Congress' Commerce Clause power.”); 
Jordan Goldberg, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why Pro-
gressives Might be Tempted to Embrace Federalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 
309-10 (2006) (“A massive about-face occurred in 1937, substantially changing 
the purpose and use of the Commerce Clause. In response to the New Deal, the 
Court redefined Congress's power to regulate some commerce that began with 
intrastate activity. …  This…opened the door to a line of cases that gradually 
increased Congress's power under the Commerce Clause until it appeared to be 
plenary.”). 
99 Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the 
New Deal Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 35-37 (2012) (“A Court 
bound by a limiting principle that prohibited congressional regulation of wholly 
intrastate activities that did not have a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce, would not have found the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional.”); 
Id. (“but for the substantial effects doctrine of the New Deal Commerce Clause, 
the effort [to prohibit eradicate private segregation] would have been unsuccess-
ful.”); Id. (describing Court’s holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was con-
stitutional as “nothing left with which to do the right thing other than to manip-
ulate the Constitution through the Commerce Clause. … The manipulation took 
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VII prohibiting employment discrimination,100 and of important 
federal consumer protection statutes.101  In other words, many em-
ployment and consumer claims would not exist but for the same 
                                                             
place and the theoretical underpinnings for it came straight out of the New 
Deal.”); See also 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Federal Civil Rights Acts § 1:19 (3d ed. 
2017) (“Beginning in 1937 with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., how-
ever, the epoch of the ‘modern’ Commerce Clause began, resulting in a series of 
cases that seemed to virtually eliminate any meaningful restraints on the power 
of Congress to use the Commerce Clause as a device for sweeping federal crimi-
nal, civil rights, social, and welfare legislation. For the purposes of federal civil 
rights laws, of course, this expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause re-
ceived its most important application in the cases that upheld the constitution-
ality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”) (citing U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, (1941); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).  
100 Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Dismantling Civil Rights: Multiracial Re-
sistance and Reconstruction, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 550 (2001) (“Title VII is a 
key provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the most important federal 
legislation outlawing employment discrimination.”); Alexander Tsesis, Further-
ing American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. 
REV. 307, 359 (“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [was passed by Con-
gress] on the basis of its Commerce Clause powers.”); Melissa Hart, Conflating 
Scope of Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court’s ‘Strict Scrutiny’ 
of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 VILL. L. 
REV. 1091, 1094-95 (2001) (“Federal laws prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment have generally been passed under both the Commerce Clause and section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the moment, it remains well-settled that 
Congress can pass these laws pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority.”). 
101 Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 378 (1973) 
(The Truth in Lending Act “is within the power granted to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause. It is not a function of the courts to speculate as to whether 
the statute is unwise or whether the evils sought to be remedied could better have 
been regulated in some other manner.”). Stephen Lamson, The Impact of the 
Federal Arbitration Act and the McCarran-Ferguson Act on Uninsured Motor-
ist Arbitration, 19 CONN. L. REV. 241, 261 (1987) (“Congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause, however, clearly extends to essentially local transactions, 
including contracts between residents of the same state. An example of the exer-
cise of such power is the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Act has been upheld as 
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause, and has been applied 
to a wide variety of creditors in essentially local transactions, including automo-
bile dealers, home repair companies and sellers of real estate.”); Arthur B. Mark, 
III, Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship since Lopez: A Survey, 32 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 671, 679-81 (2004) (“The final case in the New Deal trilogy is Wickard 
v. Filburn.  In Wickard, the Court approved Congress's use of a virtually unlim-
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post-FAA expansion of “commerce” that enables FAA section 2 to 
enforce agreements to arbitrate those claims.  
In sum, the Court’s broadening of “commerce” since 1937 
gave un-originalist breadth to countless areas of federal law, usu-
ally toward progressive ends. The un-originalist breadth of FAA 
section 2 is a rare conservative (contract-enforcing) consequence of 
this broadening. So, asking courts to turn back the clock to a nar-
row, pre-1937 understanding of “commerce” for the FAA, but not 
for the many other areas of broadened federal law, smacks of re-
sult-oriented inconsistency discriminating in favor of progressive 
statutes and against conservative statutes.  
 
III. FAA’S § 1’S EMPLOYMENT EXCLUSION 
 
The previous sections defended the Court’s application of 
FAA section 2 to consumer transactions “involving commerce,” as 
both (1) supported by the statutory text, and (2) implied by—or at 
least a by-product of—the Court’s post-FAA broadening of “com-
merce.” In contrast, the Court’s application of the FAA to most 
employment arbitration agreements is less clearly supported by 
statutory text and post-FAA broadening of “commerce.” 
FAA section 1 says “nothing herein contained shall apply to 
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce.”102 The Supreme Court’s 2001 Circuit City decision inter-
                                                             
ited power under the Commerce Clause over intrastate activity. … Once Wick-
ard established the aggregation doctrine, there were no effective limits on Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Court approved federal reach 
into a range of intrastate activities. … Later, in Perez v. United States, the Court 
approved federal prohibition of loan sharking or “extortionate credit transac-
tions” even while acknowledging that the conduct was “purely intrastate.” The 
conduct at issue in Perez was a loan of approximately $3,000 and extortion in-
volving threats against the debtor and his family for non-payment or payment 
in insufficient amounts. Emphasizing Congress's findings that extortionate loan 
transactions “tie-in” to interstate commerce and that loan-sharking was a nation-
wide problem, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act.”).   
102 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“‘commerce’, as herein defined, means commerce 
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the 
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prets this provision to exclude from the FAA’s scope only the em-
ployment arbitration agreements of transportation workers, like 
seamen and railroad employees, but not of other employees.103 
Lower courts have followed this interpretation,104 which produces 
what I have described as the “strange result of a federal statute 
governing employees less closely connected to interstate commerce, 
while state law governs employees most closely connected to it.”105  
This strange result could have been avoided by emphasizing 
that section 1 excludes from the FAA’s coverage, not only “seamen” 
and “railroad employees,” but also “any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” and then interpreting 
“workers engaged in ... commerce” flexibly to broaden along with 
the Court’s broadening of “commerce” in post-FAA constitutional 
decisions.106 Under this statutory interpretation, as the types of jobs 
in “commerce” expanded to bring employees under FAA section 2, 
                                                             
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and 
another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or be-
tween the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but 
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.”). 
103 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
104 Compare, e.g., Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351–52 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (customer service representative for interstate trucking company, who 
fielded calls from customers regarding their shipment orders, was not a trans-
portation worker and thus was governed by FAA); Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 
398 F. 3d 1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2005) (an account manager who as part of his 
job duties transports merchandise across the Georgia/Alabama border was not 
a transportation worker), with Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 
593 (3d Cir. 2004) (employee was a “transportation worker” because “she was 
responsible for ‘monitoring and improving the performance of drivers under 
[her] supervision to insure [sic] timely and efficient delivery of packages.’ Such 
direct supervision of package shipments makes Palcko’s work “so closely related 
[to interstate and foreign commerce] as to be in practical effect part of it.”); In re 
Villanueva, 311 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (FAA inapplicable to truck 
driver). 
105 WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 76, at 178 n.9 (citing Richard A. Epstein, 
Fidelity Without Translation, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 21, 27–29 (1997)). The statement 
in the text refers to law governing employment arbitration as opposed to labor 
arbitration. That distinction is discussed in WARE & LEVINSON, at 176-82. Many 
transportation workers are governed by federal labor arbitration law. Id. at 304.  
106 See supra text at notes 99-102. 
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the types of employees excluded from the FAA by section 1 would 
have similarly expanded, thus leaving most employment arbitra-
tion agreements excluded from the FAA. This interpretation of sec-
tion 1 was advocated, before Circuit City, by Matthew Finkin, who 
wrote: “As the commerce power has been expanded by the United 
States Supreme Court, the [FAA section 1 employment] exemption 
has expanded along with it, leaving the status of these employees’ 
contracts in practical effect just as they were when the Act was 
passed.”107 
While this interpretation has much appeal, Circuit City’s 
counter-argument is also coherent. The Circuit City Court distin-
guished FAA section 2’s “involving commerce”—construed as ex-
tending to the full reach of Congress’s Commerce power—from 
section 1’s “in commerce”—a term of art the Court has, in several 
contexts, construed more narrowly.108 Circuit City said, “the word 
‘involving,’ like ‘affecting,’ signals an intent to exercise Congress’ 
commerce power to the full. Unlike those phrases, however, the 
general words ‘in commerce’ and the specific phrase ‘engaged in 
commerce’ are understood to have a more limited reach.”109 This 
distinction was not fabricated by the Circuit City majority, as the 
Court cited non-arbitration cases reading “in commerce” more nar-
rowly than the full reach of Congress’s Commerce power.110  
In addition, Circuit City cited non-arbitration cases declin-
ing to “afford significance, in construing the meaning of the statu-
tory jurisdictional provisions ‘in commerce’ and ‘engaged in com-
merce,’ to the circumstance that the statute predated shifts in the 
                                                             
107 Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Ar-
bitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 282, 298 (1996) (“As the commerce power has been expanded by the United 
States Supreme Court, the [FAA section 1 employment] exemption has expanded 
along with it, leaving the status of these employees’ contracts in practical effect 
just as they were when the Act was passed.”) 
108 532 U.S. at 115-19. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (citing United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 
422 U.S. 271, 279–280 (1975) (phrase “engaged in commerce” is “a term of art, 
indicating a limited assertion of federal jurisdiction”); Jones v. United States, 529 
U.S. 848, 855 (2000) (phrase “used in commerce” “is most sensibly read to mean 
active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, 
or past connection to commerce”). 
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Court's Commerce Clause cases.”111 Circuit City rejected giving 
FAA section 1 “a broader construction than justified by its evident 
language simply because it was enacted in 1925 rather than 
1938.”112 The Court concluded: 
 
While it is of course possible to speculate that Con-
gress might have chosen a different jurisdictional for-
mulation [in FAA section 1] had it known that the 
Court would soon embrace a less restrictive reading 
of the Commerce Clause, the text of § 1 precludes in-
terpreting the exclusion provision to defeat the lan-
guage of § 2 as to all employment contracts.  
 
As the conclusion we reach today is directed 
by the text of § 1, we need not assess the legislative 
history of the exclusion provision.113  
 
However confident one is that Congress would have written FAA 
section 1 differently had it anticipated the Court’s 1937 broadening 
of “commerce,”114 Circuit City can at least be defended on the 
ground that it is consistent with mainstream approaches to statu-
tory interpretation that, for good reasons, prioritize statutory text 
over legislative history,115 and with non-arbitration decisions de-
clining to give significance, in construing statutory text, to its en-
actment before 1937’s constitutional change.116  
                                                             
111 Id. (citing FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); United States 
v. American Building Maintenance, 422 U.S. 271, 277–283 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199–202 (1974)). 
112 Id. at 118. 
113 532 U.S. at 119. 
114 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 128 (2001) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (“no one interested in the enactment of the FAA ever in-
tended or expected that § 2 would apply to employment contracts.”); Norris, su-
pra note 17.  
115 See supra note 45. For reasons to consider legislative history, see, e.g., 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132-33 (2001) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
116 In contrast, Justice Souter’s dissent in Circuit City would “look beyond 
the four corners of the statute” and distinguish the non-arbitration cases as not 
“deal[ing] with the question here, whether exemption language is to be read as 
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In sum, Circuit City’s strange result has a defensible basis 
in statutory text and the Court’s post-FAA broadening of “com-
merce.” Whether defensible enough to outweigh Professor Finkin’s 




Even the Supreme Court’s current (conservative) interpre-
tation of the FAA still significantly permits contract-law doctrines, 
such as unconscionability, to protect consumers and employees 
from harsh adhesive arbitration agreements.117 And the centrist in-
terpretation of the FAA I advocate—abolishing the separability 
doctrine, increasing judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions on 
mandatory law and  softening enforcement of class waivers—
would enable contract-law doctrines to protect parties from harsh 
adhesive arbitration agreements as fully as they protect parties 
from other harsh terms of adhesion contracts.118 But this is not 
enough for progressives who want non-contract law to give con-
sumers and employees more protection against harsh adhesive ar-
bitration agreements than contract law does. Some progressives 
would make adhesive arbitration agreements harder to enforce 
than other adhesive terms by requiring “knowing consent” 119—per-
haps the goal of the statute overturned in Casarotto. Other progres-
sives would go even further by prohibiting all adhesive arbitration 
agreements.120  
Today’s progressives—long accustomed to non-contract 
laws protecting consumers and employees from harsh adhesion 
contract terms drafted by businesses—understandably oppose dis-
                                                             
petrified when coverage language is read to grow.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 137 (2001) (Souter, J. dissenting). 
117 See, e.g., WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 76, § 25 (citing cases holding 
arbitration agreements unconscionable). 
118 Ware, supra note 62, at 56-59. 
119 Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals 
for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711, 734 (2016) (“the Moderately Progressive 
Position would enforce an individual's pre-dispute arbitration agreement if it is 
non-adhesive”); id. at n.101 (citing commentators advocating that position). 
120 Id. at 733-34. 
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placement of these post-1937 laws by a pre-1937 statute, FAA sec-
tion 2. And they make a strong argument that this displacement 
would not occur but for the Supreme Court interpreting that stat-
ute more broadly than its drafters and adopters intended. But that 
un-originalist breadth is merely a part of a much broader un-
originalist breadth (expansion of the Commerce Clause in and after 
1937) that, along with the near-simultaneous Erie decision, funda-
mentally re-ordered federal/state relations. So, unless progressives 
shockingly reverse course by arguing to shrink federal power back 
to pre-1937 levels, consistency requires them to seek reduced en-
forcement of adhesive arbitration agreements through legislation, 
rather than Supreme Court reversal of Southland, Casarotto, and 
related decisions. 
 
